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Abstract 
 
Compared to both Canada and the United States, Australia has been slow to 
approve commercial planting of transgenic crops. Two probable reasons exist for the 
slow approval rate of transgenic crops in Australia.  The first reason is community 
perceptions about the risks associated with transgenic technologies. The second is the 
regulatory framework currently employed to approve commercial releases.  This paper 
examines some of the potential regulatory issues that may be affecting the review process 
and approval of transgenic technologies.  First we provide a brief introduction to the 
regulatory structure in Australia, second we consider the impact of regional, national and 
state jurisdictions, third we argue that the regulator needs to consider the use of benefits 
analysis in decision making, fourth we argue for the use of probabilistic risk assessments 
in certain circumstances, and fifth we look at potential problems inherent in majority 
voting in a committee and recommend alternatives.   
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Compared to both Canada and the United States, with 4.4 and 42.8 million 
hectares respectively of transgenic crops under cultivation,
5 Australia has been slow to 
approve commercial planting of transgenic crops. To date Australia has planted only 0.2 
million hectares of transgenic crops, principally of GM insect-resistant cotton but also a 
small area of carnations modified for color.
6 In 2003, approval was given for the release 
of a third crop, herbicide tolerant canola.
7  However, despite national regulatory approval, 
a number of Australian State governments imposed moratoriums on commercial 
plantings. Currently, there are several crop transgene combinations awaiting regulatory 
approval. 
Two probable reasons exist for the slow approval rate of transgenic crops in 
Australia.  The first reason is Australian community perceptions about the risks 
associated with transgenic technologies
8 and the second is the regulatory framework 
                                                 
1 International Food Policy Research Institute (IFPRI), Washington D.C., USA. Email:. 
n.linacre@cgiar.org. 
2 International Food Policy Research Institute (IFPRI), Washington D.C., USA. Email: j.falck-
zepeda@cgiar.org 
3 International Food Policy Research Institute (IFPRI), Washington D.C., USA. Email: j.komen@cgiar.org 
4 Department of Economics, The University of Melbourne, Australia.  Email: d.maclaren@unimelb.edu.au 
5 James (2003). 
6 Glover (2002). 
7 OGTR (2002a). 
8 Public attitude studies suggest that approximately 66 percent of the population believe that genetic 
engineering applications, of the type surveyed, could present serious risks. For details see Biotechnology 
Public Awareness Survey Final Report (2003).   
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currently employed to approve commercial releases.  This paper examines some of the 
potential regulatory issues that may be affecting the approval of transgenic technologies. 
Two principal regulatory issues potentially affecting the adoption of transgenic crops are 
the failure of the regulatory system to include appropriate benefits assessments; and, 
ambiguity in the division of power between national and state governments.  Two 
additional issues are discussed in this paper, relating to risk assessment approaches and 
voting systems.  Neither of the two issues appears to be a major cause of regulatory 
paralysis, but may be important to address in order to encourage public confidence in 
decision-making.
9  
REGULATORY STRUCTURE IN AUSTRALIA 
The Australian Parliament passed the Gene Technology Act in the year 2000.  
The Act established a new single permanent national regulator, reporting to the National 
Parliament, an individual who is responsible for licensing and releases of genetically 
modified organisms.  To assist the single Regulator, the Act also established a new 
regulatory agency, the Office of the Gene Technology Regulator (OGTR).  The OGTR is 
the primary agency responsible for national regulation of genetically modified organisms.  
However, as the need arises because of multiple disciplines involved in the analysis a 
number of other agencies remain involved in the approval process as shown in Table 1. 
The Annex 1 provides the details of the institutions. 
                                                                                                                                                 
http://www.biotechnology.gov.au/content/controlfiles/display_details.cfm?objectid=443164A1-7F7B-
410C-BD068DA14499A560   
9 The Commonwealth Scientific and Industrial Research Organisation (CSIRO), not the Office of the Gene 
Technology Regulator (OGTR), is the organisation most respondents (40 percent) believe is likely to 
provide reliable information.  For details see Biotechnology Public Awareness Survey Final Report (2003). 
http://www.biotechnology.gov.au/content/controlfiles/display_details.cfm?objectid=443164A1-7F7B-
410C-BD068DA14499A560   
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Table 1--Responsible agencies for genetically modified organisms in Australia and 
the United States.  
Responsible Agency   
Subject Australia  USA 
Food and Food Additives   OGTR, FSANZ, AQIS  FDA, FSIS 
Pesticides  OGTR, NRA, EA  EPA, APHIS 
Biologics OGTR,  TGA,  EA  FDA 
Animals and Plants  OGTR, EA, FSANZ  APHIS, FSIS, FDA 
Source: Complied by Authors 
 
The Act is consistent with the precautionary principle that, where there are threats 
of serious or irreversible environmental damage, a lack of full scientific certainty should 
not be used as a reason for postponing cost-effective measures to prevent environmental 
degradation.  The Act directs the Regulator to take account of human health and safety 
and environmental risks in the Regulator’s deliberations on the environmental release of 
new genetically modified organisms (GMOs).  The Act does not direct the Regulator to 
consider the environmental or socio-economic benefits of such releases (Government of 
Australia 2000). 
The Act also established a policy committee and three advisory committees that 
have different roles (Figure 1). The policy committee, the Gene Technology Ministerial 
Council, issues policy principles, policy guidelines and codes of practice that govern the 
activities of the Regulator.  The Committee has powers to appoint or dismiss the 
Regulator, and the chairpersons of the Gene Technology Technical Advisory Committee, 
the Gene Technology Community Consultative Committee, and the Gene Technology 
Ethics Committee.  The Gene Technology Community Consultative Committee 
(GTCCC) advises the Regulator and the Ministerial Council on community views on 
issues surrounding the regulation of gene technology and allows for community input 
into the development of the policy guidelines and codes of practice.  The Gene  
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Technology Ethics Committee (GTEC) provides advice to the Regulator and the 
Ministerial Council on ethical issues relating to gene technology.  
The Gene Technology Technical Advisory Committee (GTTAC) plays a central 
role in peer review of the risk assessment and management plans developed by staff in 
the OGTR.  The Regulator must seek input from the GTTAC on the risk assessment and 
risk management plans developed by the OGTR (OGTR 2002b).  A negative finding by 
this Committee would condemn any license proposal.  From this perspective the 
Committee, while advisory, is pivotal in the decision making process because it is 
unlikely that the Regulator would ignore a safety recommendation by the committee.  
The Committee is composed of 18 expert members drawn from a range of disciplines.  
Regulations to the Act specify the use of majority voting for decision-making by the 
GTTAC (Box 1).   
 
Box 1--Provision for Voting in GTA 
Division 2 section 28 of the Gene Technology Regulations 2001 specify following 
decisions by majority voting.  
 
(1)  A decision of the Gene Technology Technical Advisory Committee is made by a 
majority of the members present, and voting for the decision, at a Committee meeting. 
 
(2)  The member presiding at a Committee meeting has a deliberative vote and also 
has a casting vote in the event of an equality of votes by members present. 
 








Figure 1--Interrelationship between the Gene Technology Regulator, the agency and 




Impact of regional, national, state jurisdictions  
Existing regional structures are in place to develop coordinated standards for the 
approval of foods. Food Standards Australia New Zealand (FSANZ) is a bi-national 
independent statutory authority that develops food standards for composition, labeling 
and contaminants, including microbiological limits, that apply to all foods produced or 
imported for sale in Australia and New Zealand.  In Australia FSANZ is involved in the 
approval process for transgenic crops destined for human consumption (Table 1). Despite 
the success of the FSANZ regional approach, no coordinated approach exists for the 





















Zealand.  A regional approach to the environmental approval of transgenic crops may be 
difficult to develop due to difference in ecological systems between Australia and New 
Zealand. 
The issue is also complicated at a domestic level in Australia.  In 2003, approval 
was given by the OGTR for the release of a third crop, herbicide tolerant canola .
10  GM 
canola is a contentious issue with some interest groups because of the possibility of gene 
flow. Oil seed rape (Brassica napus) comprises 45-50 percent of Australia’s canola crop.  
The pollen from B. napus is heavy and sticky but may become airborne due to its small 
size.  The pollen is primarily dispersed by wind with the honeybee being an important 
dispersal vector over longer distances.  The majority of pollen travels less than 10 meters.  
However, long distance dispersal events can occur due to wind (1.5 km) and insects (4 
km).   The proposed release was for canola modified to be tolerant to glufosate, replacing 
low yielding conventionally derived triazine tolerant canola.  The GM variety was 
expected to provide environmental benefits, replacing triazine compounds, which remain 
persistent in both soils and water, with glufosate, which breaks down more rapidly .
11 
However, despite national regulatory approval that GM canola is safe for 
commercial release, a number of Australian State governments imposed moratoriums on 
commercial plantings.  In Australia state governments are responsible for land 
management issues.  This demarcation of responsibilities between the national and state 
level allows state governments to impose moratoria. 
 
                                                 
10 OGTR (2002a). 
11 Salisbury (2002a; 2002b).   
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In Victoria, the State Government commissioned a study to help it determine 
whether or not the moratorium should be extended beyond the initial one year.
12  Despite 
sound economic analysis, and a recommendation that the State government should allow 
commercial plantings for a limited period, in order to establish the magnitude of the risks 
involved, political considerations took precedence and the moratorium was extended for a 
further four years based on the perceived concerns of the community about GM crops. 
Cost benefit analysis 
The risk assessment framework used by the OGTR does not explicitly allow any 
consideration of the human health or environmental benefits that might accrue from the 
release of a GM organism.
13 It is stated in the risk analysis framework that, “the risk 
assessment will be transparent, objective and scientifically based.  It is purely based on 
risk, not on a balance of risk and benefit” (emphasis added).
14  It is also stated that: 
“[e]ither the risk will be too great to permit the dealing to proceed, or the risk will be 
manageable, or there will be no risk that requires management.”
15 The natural question to 
ask is: at what level is the risk too high?  For example, in the risk assessment and 
management plans, words such as low, negligible, and manageable are used (e.g. OGTR 
2002d, 2002e).  However, if the status quo is presumed safe, then any technological 
change creates some risk no matter how small and a justification is required for 
undertaking the risk.  This justification is missing from GM crop risk assessments under 
                                                 
12 This report is available at 
http://www.dpi.vic.gov.au/dpi/nrensr.nsf/93a98744f6ec41bd4a256c8e00013aa9/7ffeecb5f7229f0bca256eca
0028583b/$FILE/Lloyd%20Part%203.pdf.  Subsequent to the Government’s decision, Monsanto decided 
to cease its research on this crop in Victoria. 
13 OGTR (2002b). 
14 OGTR (2002b), p15. 
15 OGTR (2002b).  
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the Australian system (e.g. OGTR 2002d, 2002e). More comprehensive analyses should 
also consider the risks of not approving novel GM products, which may imply the 
continued use of, for example, triazine. 
Without explicit consideration in the conduct of a risk assessment of any benefits, 
it is difficult to understand how any decision, no matter how inconsequential the 
incremental increase in the risk, could be made in favor of the release of a GMO.  In 
other words, the underlying philosophy of the Act is risk minimization rather than the 
more comprehensive philosophy of balancing the overall social costs and benefits of 
licensing a particular GM crop.
16 
To illustrate this deficiency in the current approach taken in the Act, suppose that 
a genetically modified virus that targets the reproductive system of foxes, makes them 
infertile.  The fox is an introduced species in Australia that is thought to be responsible 
for the decline of many small, endangered, marsupial populations.  The risk is that the 
virus could mutate and spread to the native dog (the dingo) and to dogs kept as domestic 
pets.  On a purely risk basis such a proposal is unlikely to be approved because no 
recognized benefit is calculated against which to compare the cost.  However, a decision 
to accept the risk to dingoes and domestic dogs can only be made sensibly in relation to 
the conservation benefits derived from a reduction in fox numbers.   
Another deficiency in the current approach is that the Australian Gene 
Technology Regulator ignores the economic behavioural response of individuals towards 
the environmental management rules set by the regulator and excludes consideration of 
economic benefits and costs.  Such a position ignores the important role economics plays 
                                                 
16  By contrast, in the report to the Victorian Government, the expert (Lloyd P.)  used a social costs and 
benefits framework to arrive at his recommendations.  
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in shaping the decisions individuals make.  Behavioral analysis is essential because if an 
economic incentive exists for non-compliance, then the rules set by the Regulator are 
unlikely to be followed unless adequately enforced.  This is a well-documented problem 
in the United States, where concern about the emergence of insect resistance in the 
European corn borer, prompted the establishment of refugia (areas set aside for planting 
non-genetically modified crops).  Such areas may or may not be effective in managing 
the emergence of insect resistance, much depends on the economic behavioral response 
of farmers to this added cost and the ability of the United States EPA to enforce the 
rules.
17  
The idea of explicit benefit calculations in risk management is not new.  Kopp et 
al. (1997), Omenn et al. (1997), Farrow and Toman (1998), and Lutter (1999) all argue 
for the integration of benefit-cost analysis and risk assessment.  The purpose of benefit-
cost analysis is to assist social decision-making, the objective being the efficient 
allocation of society’s resources.
18  Some authors consider that risk assessment is a subset 
of benefit analysis.
19  In the simplest cases expected utility theory may be used as the 
method of integrating benefit cost analysis and risk assessment. 
However, cost benefit cost analysis may be criticized on a number of grounds.  Of 
particular importance is the utilitarian assumption germane to cost-benefit analysis: the 
aggregation of individual utilities should be maximized, trading one person’s utility gains 
against another person’s utility losses.
20  Benefit-cost analysis also suffers from a number 
of practical problems that limit its value for decision making.  For example, cost-benefit 
                                                 
17 US EPA (2000).  
18 Boardman et al. (1996). 
19 Kopp et al. (1997). 
20 Boardman et al. (1996).  
 
10
analysis is also not “value free” and the usefulness of the analysis depends on the quality, 
training, and objectivity of the analysts undertaking the valuation.
21  The valuation of 
benefits and the choice of discount rates can be problematic, especially when non-market 
quantities are involved.
22     
Despite these problems with the measurement of expected social benefits, we 
believe that the framework of social benefit cost analysis is worth using because it 
provides a more balanced and comprehensive approach to social decision making, in this 
case, GMO regulation.   
Probabilistic risk assessment 
The regulator in Australia uses qualitative risk assessments based on expert 
judgments about risk. These expert judgments are supported by empirical studies (e.g. 
Rieger et al. 2002).
23  However, this approach has problems.  Psychological research on 
human perceptions of risk suggests that experts have difficulty in making objective 
assessments of risk because they are prone to a variety of perceptual biases known as 
information processing shortcuts which include: anchoring, framing, and hindsight bias.
24  
The alternative to qualitative risk assessment is the use of probabilistic risk assessments, 
based on mathematical models, in which the assumptions and dependencies are made 
explicit and in which the effects of these assumptions can be measured and the most 
important ones identified.   
                                                 
21 Lave (1996). 
22 Lave (1996). 
23 OGTR (2002b). 
24 Various authors have discussed these issues at length, e.g. Slovic et al. 1974a, 1974b, Slovic et al. 1975, 
1979, Fischhoff et al. 1982, Slovic et al. 1982, Kahneman and Tversky 1984.  
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The OGTR in Australia views probabilistic risk assessments as having limited 
value owing to a lack of the direct ecological information which is needed to build such 
models in the context of risks to the environment .
25  At least in some situations of 
importance, sufficient data are probably available for the development of basic decision 
models.  For example, Rieger et al. (2002) and Salisbury (2002) provide data on canola 
gene flow, which could be used as a basis for model building and sensitivity analysis.  
The position of the OGTR only serves to highlight the weakness of its approach in which 
only qualitative assessments are used, because it fails to make explicit the vagueness of 
the probabilities involved, a vagueness which can be recognized and built into 
quantitative models and modeling processes by which, through alternative values, 
probabilities can be assessed. The significance of these probabilities for risk, and the 
consequent decision, can then be assessed through simulations. 
The decision to approve the release of herbicide tolerant canola provides an 
example of the potential application of probabilistic risk assessments.  In this situation the 
decision was based on a series of studies of gene flow, for example see Rieger et al. 
(2002).  However, a probabilistic risk assessment (mathematical) model, in which the 
assumptions and dependencies were explicit, may have augmented expert opinion by 
better informing decision makers about the risks of gene flow by providing a tool to 
explore the effects of spatial scale on gene flow.  Such models may also have provided 
the regulator with a defensible method for establishing isolation distances to limit gene 
flow. 
                                                 
25 OGTR (2002b).  
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Group decision making 
The method enshrined in the regulations to the Act is that the GTTAC use 
majority voting to arrive at its recommendation to the Regulator to grant or to refuse a 
license.  Now majority voting is only one possible way of aggregating the preferences of 
individuals in a group in order to arrive at the optimal choice for the group and, as will be 
shown below, it is not necessarily the best way.  Before discussing the optimal choice for 
a group, it is necessary to outline elements of the theory of individual choice.  The 
remaining material in this sub-section draws heavily from Allingham (2002). 
In order to characterize an individual’s choices over a closed set of a finite 
number of mutually exclusive choices, it is necessary to make certain assumptions.  The 
concept of a preference relation is a useful way of imposing some basic structure on such 
choices.  It involves being able to specify for any pair-wise choices amongst alternatives, 
such as A and B, that either A is at least as good as B ( B Af ) or B is at least as good as A 
( A Bf ).  If B Af  and  A Bf , then the individual is indifferent between the two () B A ~ .  
A second assumption is made which imposes certain consistency on choices.  If there 
were three objectives of choice, A, B and C, then if for the individual, 
C A C B B A f f f  then  ,   and   .  With this second assumption, that of transitivity, the 
preference relation becomes a preference ordering which allows a ranking of the objects 
of choice from best to worst.  If the individual makes choices consistent with these two 
conditions, then the choices are said to be rational. 
In order to investigate the choices of a group of rational individuals, some further 
concepts are required.  First, a group is a collection of at least three individuals.  The 
rules for aggregating the individuals’ preferences into a group decision is called a  
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constitution.  There are two issues with respect to constitutions which are important for 
this paper: the first is the way in which individuals’ preferences are used to arrive at a 
group decision, i.e., the rule of aggregation; and the second is whether the rule will 
generate a group choice. 
One of the most commonly used rules is the majority rule.  It appears to combine 
the preferences of the individual members of the group in a reasonable way, if the 
conditions of neutrality, responsiveness and anonymity are imposed.  However, the actual 
choice made may not be satisfactory because this rule may lead to no choice at all.  The 
latter unsatisfactory situation arises when the individuals’ preferences are cyclic.
26  In an 
attempt to overcome the non-existence of the group’s choice when that choice is made 
using majority voting, a variation is sometime advocated, namely, voting in two rounds.  
In this situation control of the order of voting can pre-determine the group’s choice.
27  
This creates the possibility of controlling the agenda and influencing the outcome, which 
raises the issue of strategic voting, if the members of the group realize what is going on.
28   
                                                 
26 For example suppose that there are three members of a group, M1, M2 and M3, and there are three 
choices available, namely, A, B and C.  The preference orderings of the members are:  
. 3 ; 2 ; 1 B A C M A C B M C B A M f f f f f f   Majority voting will fail.  M1 and M3 rank 
A above B and, therefore, B cannot be chosen;  M1 and M2 rank B above C and, therefore, C cannot be 
chosen;  and M2 and M3 rank C above A and so A cannot be chosen.  Another feature of this example is 
that the outcome does not satisfy the condition of transitivity.  In choosing between A and B, A gets two 
votes;  in choosing between B and C, B gets two votes;  and because  ,   and   C B B A f f then by 
transitivity,  C A f .  Yet majority voting reveals that  A C f .  This example illustrates the case that there 
may not exist any group choice based on the majority voting rule. 
27 To see this possibility, assume that in the first round it is decided by the agenda setter that a vote will be 
taken of A against B with the winner facing C in the second round.  Using the members of the group above 
and their preferences, in the first round A will win and in the second round C will beat A to be the overall 
choice.  However, had the controller decided that the first round should involve a choice between B and C, 
then the first-round winner would be B and, in the second round, A would be the group’s choice.  Finally, if 
the choice in the first round involved A against C, then C would win and go into the second round against B 
and would lose to B. 
28 For example, M1 might decide on the first round of a vote between A and B to vote for B, even although 
A is preferred to B, because in the second round, the individual knows that B will beat C and, for this 
individual, B is preferred to C.  However, in a group of several individuals, and with secret ballots, it is 
unlikely that individuals in the group will have sufficient common knowledge to vote in this way.  
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There exist a few alternatives to the majority voting rule.  The extent to which 
these rules are useful depends upon the conditions which they impose on the aggregation 
rule.  If completeness and transitivity are imposed, then the majority rule may fail to 
provide a group choice, as shown in the example above.  However, these are not the only 
possible conditions.  Others include the weaker conditions of independence and 
unanimity.
29  With only these two conditions imposed upon the aggregation of the 
individuals’ preferences, the only rational outcome for the group, i.e., one arrived at 
through a preference ordering, is to have a dictator make the decision for the group.  This 
famous, but destructive, result is known as Arrow’s Impossibility theorem (Arrow 
1963).
30 
In the context of decision making under uncertainty it is probable that individuals 
will have different intensities of preferences over the objects of choice.  So far, the rules 
explored do not take account of this possibility nor can they because they are based 
implicitly on an ordinal scale.  In order to incorporate intensity of preferences, it would 
be necessary to measure utility on a cardinal scale and also to allow interpersonal 
comparisons to be made amongst members of the group.  This is what is done in a 
utilitarian framework in which the group’s choice is the one which maximizes the 
group’s utility. 
                                                 
29 The independence condition means that the group’s choice between A and B does not change in response 
to a re-ordering of an individual’s preferences which leaves the alternatives A and B ranked as before.  The 
unanimity condition means that if everyone in the group prefers A to B, then the group will choose A alone.   
30  As an alternative, if the condition known as anonymity is also imposed, then a slightly better result may 
be achieved by the group, although at the cost of its decisions not being transitive.  This result is known as 
the Pareto rule:  if there is no other choice which every individual in the group ranks above a specific one, 
then that specific one is the group’s choice.  However, this rule in practice is not particularly helpful 
because, unless every member of the group happens to agree, there is no single, group choice possible by 
the Pareto rule. Other rules for group decision making include Borda’s rule and the patriarch rule (see 
Allingham 2002, ch. 6)  
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Limitations of analysis 
The simplicity of our analysis may be criticized on a number of grounds. Much 
debate surrounds the various assumptions of utility theory when used to represent a group 
of individuals.     
For a variety of reasons people find it difficult to optimize their decisions. Simon 
(1956) argues that in practice individuals have a limited range of alternatives, i.e. we do 
not know all the decision options available to us, and, even if we do, our conceptual 
limitations and time prevent us from comparing all of the options available.  It is argued 
that cognitive limitations of the decision-makers force them to construct simplified 
models of the world to deal with decisions.
31  The result is that decision makers strive to 
attain some level of satisfaction within constraints that we do not necessarily optimize .
32  
For example, it is unlikely in practice that preferences of committee members could be 
known at such a detailed level, suggested in our analysis, i.e., they each may not know 
the possible states of nature let alone the probabilities associated with each state. 
Research in psychology also suggests that the way in which two options are 
framed or described can affect the preferences that individuals have for different options, 
although the options are in fact identical. The consequence of this is that people do not 
necessarily show transitive preferences.
33 
Another important limitation of our analysis is that if cycling is as pervasive as 
suggested, then it would be expected that the GTTAC’s decisions would gyrate from 
meeting to meeting (e.g Mueller 1989:p89).  The fact that this does not happen suggests 
that other processes are occurring that convey some stability.  Although regulations to the 
                                                 
31 Slovic et al. (1974b). 
32 Simon (1956). 
33(Slovic et al. (1982), Tversky and Kahneman (1982), Kahneman and Tversky (1984).  
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Act require the expert committee (GTTAC) to use majority voting,
34 it is likely that the 
Committee works by consensus most of the time.  However, when critical disagreements 
do arise, majority voting is used.   
CONCLUSION 
We have attempted to show: first, that division of powers between the national 
government and state governments has led to regulatory paralysis over GM canola; 
second that cost benefit analysis has a role in societal decision making; third that 
qualitative risk assessment have some deficiencies when used to guide public policy and 
probabilistic risk assessments may be more useful in guiding decisions; and fourth, that 
even if the preferences of the individuals who comprise a committee are well-defined, it 
is no simple matter to aggregate these preferences in a meaningful way, i.e., a way which 
leads to a reasonable outcome from the group.  It is certainly not necessarily the case, as 
our example shows, that majority voting will lead to a reasonable outcome.  Control of 
the agenda can pre-determine the outcome of a committee voting process and that process 
does not weight the strength of belief that each member has about the correctness of that 
belief. 
We have attempted to contrast the decision-making process of the OGTR, which 
involves qualitative risk assessment, a cost-only approach and majority voting (based on 
an ordinal scale of preferences), with the feasible alternative of probabilistic risk 
assessment, the measurement of both costs and benefits and the use of monetary values to 
measure them (a cardinal scale).  It is important for the quality of public policy making in 
                                                 
34 Commonwealth of Australia(2001)  
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the area of risk assessment and the release of GM crops that these distinctions were more 
widely debated.
35 
There are a number of simple alternative voting procedures that the Committee 
could follow, such as exhaustive ballots (e.g. Mueller 1989:p112).  However, none of 
these approaches provides the Regulator with any information on the range of views 
expressed by the Committee.  Since the aim of the Regulator is to make decisions based 
on an assessment of risk and, where there are different views about the size of the risk, it 
is essential that a range of views be expressed.  A useful alternative procedure that reports 
a range of views is the Delphi system (Linstone 1999), first used by RAND, which 
provides a structured way to elicit judgments from expert panels using questionnaires 
with feedback to panel members.  In this way the Regulator could obtain knowledge of 
the uncertainty (i.e., the vagueness of the relevant probabilities) associated with a 
particular recommendation. 
Even given all these changes: resolving Federal State jurisdictional conflicts, 
incorporating benefits within a probabilistic risk assessment framework, and introducing 
the Delphi system for eliciting views instead of voting, approvals for transgenic crops 
will still depend on resolving the political situation. 
                                                 
35 A similar call has been made to incorporate economics into the Agreement on the Application of Sanitary 
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Annex 1—List of abbreviations, descriptions, and URL 
Abbreviation Description  URL 
OGTR  Office of the Gene Technology Regulator 
 
www.ogtr.gov.au 
FSANZ  Food Standards Australia and New Zealand  www.foodstandards.gov.au 
AQIS  Australian Quarantine Inspection Service 
responsible for food imports 
 
www.aqis.gov.au 
NRA  National Registration Authority  www.nra.gov.au 
TGA  Therapeutic Goods Administration  www.health.gov.au 
EA Environment  Australia  www.ea.gov.au 
FDA  Federal Drug Administration  www.fda.gov 
FSIS  Food Safety Inspection Service  www.fsis.usda.gov 
EPA  Environment Protection Agency  www.epa.gov 
APHIS  Animal and Plant Health Inspection Service  www.aphis.usda.gov 
Source: Complied by Authors. 
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